Forthcoming: • "Marx and Adorno," in The Oxford Handbook on Adorno, eds. Martin Shuster and Henry Pickford, Oxford: Oxford University Press [forthcoming in 2020]. • "Was Hegel an Authoritarian Thinker? Reading Hegel's Philosophy of History on the Basis of his Metaphysics," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie [forthcoming]. • "Hegel's Metaphysics and Social Philosophy. Two Readings," in Hegel and The Frankfurt School, ed. Paul Giladi, London: Routledge [forthcoming in 2020]. Articles: • "Hermann Cohen on Kant, Sensations and Nature in Science," Journal of the History of Philosophy 57, no. 4 (2019): 647-674. • "Irrationality and Egoism in Hegel's Account of Right," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26, no. 6 (2018): 1132-1152. • "Hegel and Marx on Individuality and the Universal Good," Hegel Bulletin 39, no. 1 (2018): 61-81. • "Kant, Neo-Kantians and Transcendental Subjectivity," European Journal of Philosophy 25, no. 3 (2017): 595-616. • "Adorno, Hegel and the Concrete Universal," Philosophy and Social Criticism 37, no. 1 (2011): 73-94. • "A Hegel-Marx Debate on the Individual and Society," Studies on Marxism, [forthcoming]. • "Die UN-High Level Task Force zur Umsetzung des Rechts auf Entwicklung. Implikationen für den Menschenrechtsschutz und die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit” [The UN-High Level Task Force on the Implementation of the Right to Development: Implications for the Protection of Human Rights and Development Cooperation] In Zeitschrift für Politik, Sonderband 1 (2006): 110-128. • "Mujeres más iguales” [Some women are more equal than others] In La Cuerda. Miradas Feministas de la Realidad, [forthcoming].
Book Chapters: • "Internationale Finanzkrisen – hat Europa kein Interesse?” [International Financial Crises – Is Europe not interested?], in Interessen und Handlungsspielräume in der deutschen und europäischen Außenpolitik (2007): 317-342.
Reviews: • "Robert Pippin's Hegel's Realm of Shadows: Logic as Metaphysics in the Science of Logic," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27, no. 6 (2019): 1256-1260. • "Reason or Reasons? On the Difference between an Analytic and Continental Adorno, Hegel and Kant/ Baumann on Shuster's Autonomy After Auschwitz" In Virtual Critique, 2017. online. Translations: • Honneth, Axel, “La Pauvreté de notre Liberté. Grandeur et limites de la Théorie Hégelienne de l'Éthicité” [The emptiness of our freedom. Hegel's theory of Ethical Life, its Merit and Limits] in [title not yet agreed] Presses Universitaires de France (translation with Marina Zwaenepoel). • Gabriel, Markus, “Des Insectes Logique ou l'Idée du Vrai. La Science de la Logique comme une théorie de la vérité” [Logical Insects or the Idea of Truth. The Science of Logic as a Theory of Truth] in [title not yet agreed] Presses Universitaires de France (translation with Marina Zwaenepoel). • Schaber, Peter “Human Rights and Basic Needs,” in Human Rights and Human Nature (Berlin, Springer: 2014).
Selected Talks: • "German Idealism, Recognition and Identity Politics," public talk/Q&A with James Clarke, funded by the Goethe Institut and the Arts and Humanities Research Council, York, UK, March 2019. • "Hegel's Critique of Morality and the Non-Metaphysical Hegel," Workshop of the AHRC Research Network 'Reason, Right and Revolution,' Berlin, April 2018. • "Cohen und Kant zur Grundlegung der Naturwissenschaften," Padernborn, Mai 2016. • "Hermann Cohen on the object and affection in Kant," German Philosophy Reading Group, University of California San Diego, USA, January 2016. • Discussant and discussion leader for Klaus Vieweg’s presentation on “Hegel’s Logical Foundation of the State,” DFG-funded conference 'Logic and Politics,' Universität Paderborn, Germany, December 2013. • "Hegel’s Logic as a Theory of Freedom," Hegel’s Logic Conference, University of Warwick, United Kingdom, May 2013.
Some Abstracts: Hegel's Metaphysics and Social Philosophy: Two Readings (preliminary abstract): Since thinkers from Marx to Popper have criticised Hegel’s metaphysics for its supposedly authoritarian implications, it is only natural that the late 20th century Anglo-American efforts to rehabilitate Hegel’s philosophy were predicated on either downplaying or disregarding Hegel’s metaphysical doctrines. However, as so-called non-metaphysical Hegelians have started discussing Hegel’s metaphysics, it is time to discuss their reading against a more traditional metaphysical interpretation. After distinguishing Pippin's interpretation of Hegel's metaphysics from my more traditional and structural metaphysical view (sections 1–3), I will argue that, on the latter reading, Hegel is more realist when it comes to assessing the power of social structures (section 4), focused on structural freedom rather than agency (sections 5 and 6), and more empowering for, and lenient toward individuals who can make their interests count and are free to be irrational and egoist (section 7).
Hegel and Marx on Individuality and the Universal Good. Picking up on Marx’s and Hegel’s analyses of human beings as social and individual, the article shows that what is at stake is not merely the possibility of individuality, but also the correct conception of the universal good. Both Marx and Hegel suppose that individuals must be social or political as individuals, which means, at least in Hegel’s case, that particular interests must form part of the universal good. The good and the rational cannot be something beside individuals and their interests, something they can only endorse by leaving their individuality behind and embracing their sociality; rather it must consist in nothing but the harmonious structuring of their particular interests. While section I introduces Marx’s and Hegel’s conceptions of individual and social beings, sections II and III discuss their respective views of individuality, and sections IV and V the notion of a universal good containing individual interests.
Kant, Neo-Kantians and Transcendental Subjectivity. This article discusses an interpretation of Kant’s conception of transcendental subjectivity, which manages to avoid many worries analytic interpreters have rightly raised for this doctrine. It is an interpretation put forward by selected C19 and early C20 neo-Kantian writers. The article starts out by offering a neo-Kantian interpretation of the object as something that is constituted by the categories and serves as a standard of truth within a theory of judgment (I). The second part explicates transcendental subjectivity as the system of categories, which is self-referential and constitutes objects (II), in order to then evaluate this conception by means of a comparison with Hegel’s absolute subject (III). Rather than delineating the differences between neo-Kantian writers, the article systematically expounds a shared project, which consists in providing the ultimate foundation for judgments by means of an anti-psychologist and non-metaphysical interpretation of transcendental subjectivity.
Hegel, Adorno and the Concrete Universal. The core argument of this article is that Adorno adopts the distinction between an abstract and a concrete universal from Hegel and criticizes Hegel, on that basis, as abstract. After outlining how both apply those concepts to knowledge and society, the article presents Adorno’s critique and re-conception of Hegel’s concrete universal – and his critique of Hegel’s conception of knowledge and society that goes with it.
Hegel’s Metaphysics of Freedom. In my revised dissertation I propose a metaphysical Hegel, defending him against the authoritarian charge that has been raised by critics and offering an alternative to the dominant North-American reading. The first part of the monograph proposes Hegel’s entire Logic discusses different forms of "being with oneself in the other" or freedom. The second part interprets Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and History with the help of different logical types of “being with oneself in the other” realized in social spheres. The monograph shows that Hegel develops a structural theory of freedom and that his focus lies with society being a rational, inclusive and mutually beneficial system, rather individuals following rational norms.